We study the mechanism design problem of guaranteeing desirable performances whenever agents are rational in the sense of not playing weakly dominated strategies. We first provide an upper bound for the best performance we can guarantee among all feasible mechanisms. The bound is represented as the maximized value of the designer's objective subject to the inequality version of the standard envelope * I am grateful to Ilya Segal, Matthew Jackson, Jonathan Levin, Paul Milgrom, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann, Gabriel Carroll, Koichi Tadenuma, Hideshi Itoh, Eve Ramaekers, Olivier Tercieux, Tilman Börgers, Philippe Jehiel, Jacques Crémer, Christian Hellwig, Thomas Mariotti, Jean Tirole, and seminar participants at Stanford University, Hitotsubashi University, Yokohama National University, Duke University, University of Rochester,École Polytechnique, California Institute of Technology, Toulouse School of Economics, Boston University, University of California Davis, Paris School of Economics, University of Michigan, University of Copenhagen, and University of Glasgow for the valuable comments on various stages of the paper. I would also like to thank Marco Ottaviani and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the B.F. Haley and E.S. Shaw Fellowship for Economics through the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
incentive conditions. We then prove the bound to be tight under certain conditions on the designer's prior over the agents' payoff types in auction and bilateral-trade applications. In private-value auction and bilateral trade, the optimal mechanisms (a second-price auction and posted-price mechanism, respectively) satisfy dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, the classical notion of "robust" mechanisms. In an interdependent-value auction, we find that a second-price auction is optimal in revenue with interdependent values, which is neither dominant-strategy nor ex post incentive compatible, but satisfies the novel incentive compatibility introduced in this analysis.
Introduction
In mechanism design, a typical assumption is that agents play a Bayesian equilibrium, having a common prior over their payoff-relevant private information. However, these assumptions are sometimes considered too strong and are criticized in the literature (e.g., Wilson (1987) ). For example, in anonymous online trading environments, the parties may not know each other well, and hence, it may be too demanding to assume that the parties correctly predict each other's strategies (in order for them to play a Bayesian equilibrium), and that they share the same beliefs over their values.
In this paper, we study the problem of designing a mechanism in a more "robust" manner, so that even if these assumptions concerning the agents' possible behaviors or beliefs do not hold, the mechanism can guarantee a desirable level of performance (e.g., revenue or surplus). More specifically, we consider a situation where each agent is rational in the sense that he does not play any strategy that is weakly dominated, 1 but he may play any 1 In the literature on decision theory and game theory, admissibility is often considered a reasonable assumption for an individual's "rationality". See, for example, Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) . In the literature on implementation theory, several studies, including Börgers (1991) , Jackson (1992) , Börgers and Smith (2012b) , and Yamashita (2012) examine implementation in admissible strategies in various contexts. Note that admissibility strategy that is not weakly dominated (an admissible strategy).
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Our goal is to characterize the highest level of performance that can be guaranteed given whatever admissible strategies are played, and the mechanism that achieves this objective, which we refer to as the worst-case optimal mechanism. More specifically, we assume that a mechanism designer has a probability assessment for the agents' payoff-relevant private information, and aims to maximize the expected value of his own utility (e.g., revenue or surplus). However, the designer does not know which admissible strategy each agent plays, and therefore, he evaluates each mechanism according to his expected utility that is guaranteed (or the worst-case expected utility) among all the admissible strategy profiles of the agents. Such a "pessimistic" approach may be reasonable in situations where the agents do not know each other well, or where a mechanism must be designed far in advance, so that it is difficult to predict the agents' knowledge or beliefs about each other at the actual time of playing the mechanism.
One of the main challenges in this approach is that it is not generally possible (or at least straightforward) to invoke a revelation principle in order to focus on revelation mechanisms in seeking a desirable mechanism.
3
There is no a priori restriction on the number of messages or the dominance relations that the desirable mechanism should exhibit, and hence, the optimization problem among all mechanisms could be intractable. Nevertheless, allows only one round of elimination of weakly dominated actions, and in this sense, no mutual or common knowledge of rationality is assumed.
2 For example, they may not play a Bayesian equilibrium, because an agent may choose his strategy as a best response to his conjecture about the opponents' choices, but the conjecture may simply be wrong, and hence his actual play may not be a best response to the others' actual plays. 3 A problem of designing a mechanism where all admissible strategy profiles induce desirable outcomes in the sense of guaranteeing certain performance has a qualitatively similar feature to a full implementation problem, which aims to make all possible outcomes desirable in the sense of a social choice correspondence. As in full implementation, a desirable mechanism is not necessarily a revelation mechanism, but rather may need to have larger message spaces in order to eliminate some undesirable outcomes.
we propose a procedure to solve this optimization problem. Our approach is that, instead of attempting to characterize such an optimal mechanismwhich is potentially very complicated, we first provide an upper bound for the highest level of performance that can be guaranteed among all feasible mechanisms (Theorem 1). An advantage of this approach is that the upper bound is given by a maximization problem where standard techniques developed in the literature could be applicable. In fact, we could interpret the upper-bound problem as maximizing the designer's objective among all "revelation mechanisms" that satisfy certain incentive compatibility conditions, which, with a continuous payoff-type space, induces integral envelope expressions. In this sense, Theorem 1 may be interpreted as establishing a version of revelation principle (not for the highest performance guarantee but for its upper bound). Although this upper bound is not necessarily tight, we provide the conditions on the designer's prior under which the bound is tight, and moreover, the worst-case optimal mechanism is characterized. Precise conditions on primitives that imply the tight bounds and their interpretations vary across applications. Therefore, in the second part of the paper, we examine three applications.
The first application is the worst-case maximization of a weighted sum of revenue and surplus in a private-value auction setting. We show that, under a version of the monotone virtual-value condition in Myerson (1981) , the upper-bound level of this objective is guaranteed by a (version of a) second-price auction (Theorem 2), which is a dominant-strategy incentivecompatible mechanism.
4 The observation that desirable mechanisms in a certain robustness sense sometimes take the form of dominant-strategy or ex post incentive-compatible mechanisms (as in this and our third application) appears in several studies, but in different contexts. For example, Ledyard (1979) , Bergemann and Morris (2005) , and Börgers and Smith (2012a) consider implementation of social choice functions or correspondences of a particular class, while we consider (worst-case) maximization of the designer's objective function. Chung and Ely (2007) consider revenue maximization in private-value auction environments, and this study lies closer to our problem in this respect. We discuss the relationship in greater detail in Section 4.1. The second application is revenue maximization in an interdependentvalue auction, and the main result is worst-case optimality of a (version of a) second-price auction, under a similar condition to the first application (Theorem 3). Although this result is qualitatively similar to the first application, it has a very different interpretation. With interdependence, a second-price auction is generally neither dominant-strategy nor ex post incentive compatible. Thus, this is an instance where our upper bound implies the worst-case optimal mechanism that is neither dominant-strategy nor ex post incentive compatible. In fact, we introduce a novel incentive condition, incentive compatibility for value revelation, which a second-price auction satisfies, and we argue that this is a key incentive condition in our problem with interdependent values.
We can view this incentive compatibility for value revelation as a generalization of dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in the context of interdependent values, but in a different way from ex post incentive compatibility. In a mechanism that satisfies this incentive condition, (i) each agent is asked to report his valuation, instead of his payoff type, and (ii) the trading rule is designed so that, for each agent, reporting a valuation is not weakly dominated if and only if the agent can possess that valuation for some payoff type profile of the other agents. Hence, if an agent knows his willingness to pay by solely observing his payoff type, then truth-telling of such willingness to pay is weakly dominant. In fact, in a private-value environment, Condition (ii) immediately implies dominant-strategy incentive compatibility. However, in an interdependent-value environment, each agent may have multiple admissible messages, depending on his "belief" about the other agents' payoff types.
5 This new class of mechanisms could be useful in more general "robust" mechanism design problems with interdependent values, because, as Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006) show, only a constant objective can be ex post implementable in a generic environment with interdependent values. 6 Conversely, a mechanism with incentive compatibility for value revelation, e.g., a second-price auction, can "robustly" implement more nontrivial objectives in such an environment.
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The third application in the paper is surplus maximization in a (privatevalue) bilateral-trade setting (Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) , Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) ). We show that, under a novel condition, which we refer to as the monotone weighted surplus condition, the upper-bound level of the expected surplus is guaranteed by a posted-price mechanism (Theorem 4). A posted-price mechanism sets a trading price in advance, and the agents trade if and only if both agree to this price. This mechanism is clearly dominantstrategy incentive compatible.
Definitions and notation
There is a set of N agents, I = {1, . . . , N}. We consider a quasilinear setting, including auctions and bilateral trades as applications. Specifically, 5 To provide an intuition, imagine a bidder in an interdependent-value auction setting whose private signal indicates that his value for the object is between one and two. In a second-price auction, any bid below one and above two is weakly dominated (by bidding one or two), but any bid between one and two may be admissible.
6 Note that there are notable subclasses of nongeneric (but economically important)
environments with interdependence where their result does not apply. One of these is a one-dimensional, single-crossing environment as in Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) . Another is a private-good environment as in Bikhchandani (2006) . 7 The idea that some mechanisms that are not ex post incentive compatible may still achieve desirable outcomes in a certain robustness sense appears in Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006) and Meyer-ter-Vehn and Morris (2011) . In this paper, we also identify a necessary condition for implementable objectives in a class of problems in the form of an upper bound for the performance level we can potentially guarantee.
an allocation is denoted by x = (q i , p i ) i∈I ∈ X, where q i ∈ R represents the (one-dimensional) "assignment" to agent i, and p i ∈ R represents his payment. X may incorporate feasibility constraints. For example, in an auction,
Each agent i has a payoff-relevant signal θ i ∈ Θ i , where Θ i is a measurable space. We denote a signal profile by θ = (θ i ) i∈I ∈ Θ = i Θ i . Agent i's valuation for the assignment is v i (θ) ∈ [v i , v i ] ⊆ R, which can vary with θ −i as well as with θ i , and thus, this environment exhibits interdependent values. His utility given a signal profile θ and an allocation
Even though the allocation is one-dimensional for each agent, it does not mean that Θ i must also be one-dimensional. For example, in an auction of an oil tract, agent i's signal may be two-dimensional, say
where c i is a noisy signal of the amount of oil in the tract, and d i is an idiosyncratic component, such as the cost of digging the well, refining the oil, etc. Then, i's value may be given by v i (θ) = π i (c 1 , . . . , c N ) + d i with an increasing function π i (·) representing the estimated amount of oil in the tract for each signal profile.
} denote the set of i's possible valuations given θ i . Throughout the paper, we assume that V i (θ i ) is a compact interval. We say that an environment is a private-value environment if, for all i, we have
The designer has a utility function w : X × Θ → R. For example, for revenue maximization, we have w(x, θ) = i p i , and for surplus maximization, we have w(x, θ) = i v i (θ)q i . He also has a prior distribution over Θ, denoted by Φ ∈ ∆(Θ). However, we do not assume that the agents share the same prior. Rather, each agent may have a very different prior from the 8 As in Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006) , ex post implementation, one of the standard "robustness" concepts in the literature, has a very limited set of implementable objectives in such a multidimensional, interdependent-value environment.
designer (and from the other agents).
A mechanism is denoted by Γ = M, g , where each M i is agent i's message space, M = i M i , and g : M → X is an outcome function. Given a message profile m = (m i ) i∈I ∈ M, we denote the induced allocation by
is finite, and (ii) contains a message that corresponds to "opt-out" or "nonparticipation",
In any given mechanism, each agent i of type θ i may play any message that is admissible (i.e., not weakly dominated) in a mechanism. Definition 1. In a mechanism Γ = M, g , a message m i ∈ M i is admissible for θ i , if there exists some θ −i ∈ Θ −i such that no message weakly dominates
Because i's preference can vary with θ −i , a message m i is said to be admissible for θ i if m i is not weakly dominated given some θ −i . The implicit idea is that i may possess any "belief" for θ −i and m −i ∈ M −i . Thus, many messages may be admissible for θ i , especially when V i (θ i ) is large.
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9 Some mechanisms discussed in this paper, such as a (continuous-version of a) secondprice auction, violate the finiteness, and hence, are infeasible. However, whenever we claim that such a mechanism is "optimal", we identify a sequence of feasible mechanisms that converges (in an appropriate sense) to such a mechanism, and in this sense, we treat such a mechanism as "approximately" feasible. For details, see Section 4.1 and 4.2.
10 The concept of admissibility introduced in Definition 1 is a "belief-free" version, while the standard approach in the literature may be to define admissible messages using the agent's prior over Θ −i . The idea of "belief-freeness" appears in some other solution concepts in the literature such as in ex post equilibrium, while in an ex post equilibrium each agent is assumed to correctly know the other agents' strategies, which is not assumed in admissibility.
11 Alternatively, one may define m i as admissible for θ i if there is no m
The current definition induces a (weakly) larger set of admissible messages.
We denote by M
the set of all admissible message profiles in state θ. We evaluate a mechanism according to its guaranteed performance level given whatever admissible strategies are played. In this sense, we assume that the designer is uncertainty-averse with respect to the agents' (admissible) strategies.
Definition 2. The performance guarantee of a mechanism Γ = M, g is
The main goal of this paper is to characterize the highest performance guarantee among all feasible mechanisms, i.e., sup Γ W (Γ), under certain conditions.
An upper bound for the performance guarantee
One of the main challenges is that it is not generally possible (or at least straightforward) to invoke a revelation principle in order to focus on revelation mechanisms in seeking a desirable mechanism.
12 Because there is no a priori restriction on the number of messages or their dominance relations that the desirable mechanism should exhibit, the optimization problem among all mechanisms could be intractable.
12 In the sense that we aim to design a mechanism where all admissible strategy profiles induce desirable outcomes (in the sense of guaranteeing certain performances), it has a qualitatively similar feature to a full implementation problem. As in full implementation, a desirable mechanism is not necessarily a revelation mechanism, but rather may need to have larger message spaces in order to eliminate some undesirable outcomes. However, contrary to the popular approach in the literature on full implementation, our result does not rely on the use of mechanisms with "integer-game" or "tail-chasing" structures (see Jackson (1991) , Abreu and Matsushima (1992) ) because only finite mechanisms are feasible in our setup.
Instead of attempting to characterize such a potentially complicated optimal mechanism, we first provide an upper bound for sup Γ W (Γ). Theorem 1. For any mechanism Γ,
Therefore, W is an upper bound for sup Γ W (Γ). We prove the theorem in Section 3.1. In the remainder of this section, we provide an informal interpretation of this result. We first consider the private-value case, and then the interdependent-value case.
With private values (i.e.,
; see page 7), the upper bound has a simpler expression, as follows.
Note that f = (q, p) is an allocation rule or a revelation mechanism in a standard sense. The objective, v w(f (v), v)dΦ, is the designer's expected utility given that the agents report their values truthfully. As shown in the proof, the constraint is obtained by the "local and downward" incentive compatibility of the following kind: if agent i has value v i , then he would not be better off by pretending to have a slightly lower value than v i , regardless of the other agents' choices. In other words, the constraint is a "partial" incentive condition for truth-telling being weakly dominant. In this sense, we may interpret this result as a sort of revelation principle (not for sup Γ W (Γ) but for its upper bound), based on the local and downward incentive compatibility.
Theorem 1 (or Corollary 1) would be most useful when the upper bound is in fact a tight bound, i.e., sup Γ W (Γ) = W PV . In Section 4, in a privatevalue auction (Section 4.1) and in bilateral trade (Section 4.3), we provide sufficient conditions for each of these applications under which the solution, say f * , to the upper-bound problem given in Corollary 1 has the property that M A i (θ) = {θ i } for every i and for (Φ-)almost every θ i , i.e., truth-telling is the only admissible message. Because such f * must be dominant-strategy incentive compatible, this occurs when (i) f * is monotonic (i.e., for each i,
, and (ii) all the constraints are satisfied with equality. With a caveat treated more formally in Section 4, this suggests that the truth-telling performance, v w(f * (v), v)dΦ, is guaranteed in the revelation mechanism f * , and hence, the worst-case optimality of f * (and the tightness of the bound) is implied.
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Now we consider the interdependent-value case. Recall that
Here, f is no longer an allocation rule or a revelation mechanism in a standard sense, because the domain of f is not Θ, but
Nevertheless, we can interpret f in an analogous way as in the private-value case.
To see this, we first introduce the following novel incentive compatibility condition.
13 The caveat is that f * is not necessarily a feasible mechanism because it may have infinitely many messages, e.g., a second-price auction in Section 4.1. In that case, we construct a sequence of feasible mechanisms,
, such that their performance guarantees converge to that of f * , i.e., lim k→∞ W (Γ k ) = v w(f * (v), v)dΦ, and we interpret f * as "approximately" feasible.
Suppose that the designer uses this "value-revelation" mechanism f that is incentive compatible for value revelation. Then for agent i with θ i , any report v ′ i outside his possible values V i (θ i ) is weakly dominated. By abuse of terminology, any report v i ∈ V i (θ i ) is said to be truthful, and any report v ′ i / ∈ V i (θ i ) is said to be untruthful. The concept of incentive compatibility for value revelation has a similar spirit as that of dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, in that any untruthful reports are weakly dominated. However, for the incentive compatibility for value revelation, there is a set of "truthful" reports. Because of this multiplicity, incentive compatibility for value revelation is in general different from ex post incentive compatibility, which requires that truth-telling (of θ i rather than a valuation) is a best response regardless of the beliefs if the others are truthful.
If each agent i with θ i never reports v
, then the designer's expected utility in this value-revelation mechanism is at least
As in the private-value case, the constraint of the upper-bound problem can be interpreted as "partial" incentive compatibility conditions: if agent i knows (or believes) that his value is v i for sure, then he would not be better off by pretending to have a slightly lower value than v i . In this sense, we may interpret Theorem 1 as a sort of revelation principle (not for sup Γ W (Γ) but for its upper bound) based on the local and downward incentive compatibility for value revelation.
In the next section, in an interdependent-value auction (Section 4.2), we provide sufficient conditions under which the solution f * to the upper-bound problem is incentive compatible for value revelation. With the same caveat as in the private-value case, this suggests that the truth-telling performance is guaranteed in the value-revelation mechanism f * , and hence, the worst-case optimality of f * (and the tightness of the bound) is implied. 14 14 Again, the caveat is that f * is not necessarily feasible because it may have infinitely many messages. In that case, we construct a sequence of feasible mechanisms,
Proof of Theorem 1
This subsection is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. Fix an arbitrary feasible mechanism Γ = M, g . For each i,
and is called a private-value type. The designer's prior assigns Φ(Θ) = 1. Augmenting the type space is useful in simplifying the proof, but the result holds true even without the augmentation. In the mechanism Γ, for each
The proof consists of several lemmas. The first lemma shows a connection between the set of admissible messages for θ i and that for each private-value
As an implication of finiteness of Γ, for each i,
, without loss of generality, we assume
such that their performance guarantees converge to that of f
This implies that, for α ∈ (0, 1),
and thus,
(in a natural set order) for each k without loss of generality. Let v
The next lemma is also immediate given the finiteness of Γ. , the previous lemma implies that there is m
which implies, by continuity,
Recall that, for each i and θ i , we have M
We complete the proof by showing the desired integral envelope condition.
Lemma 4. For each i and v,
We only show the desired inequality for agent 1.
Observe that
and for each j 1 = 2, . . . , k 1 ,
and therefore, recalling v
We have shown that, given any Γ, there exists f = (q, p) such that
Therefore, for any Γ,
Applications
In this section, we consider three applications: a private-value auction, an interdependent-value auction, and a private-value bilateral trade. Under certain conditions in each of these applications, we show that the upper bound characterized in Theorem 1 is tight, and obtain the worst-case optimal mechanism. 
Private-value auction
By Theorem 1 (or Corollary 1), an upper bound for the highest performance guarantee is
We assume a generalized version of the "regularity" conditions of Myerson (1981) as in the following Assumptions 1-3. Let φ i (·) denote the marginal density for v i , and for each v −i , let φ i (·|v −i ) denote the conditional density for v i given v −i . Let Φ i (·) and Φ i (·|v −i ) denote their CDFs.
Let
denote the virtual value of agent i given v.
Assumption 2. (symmetry) For each v and its permutation v ′ (i.e., there exists a bijection π : When v is independently distributed according to the designer's prior, this condition corresponds to the monotone virtual-value condition in Myerson (1981) . As in Chung and Ely (2007) , if Φ exhibits monotone hazard rate and affiliation in the sense of Milgrom and Weber (1982) , then the condition is also satisfied. Given i and v −i , let r * 
This is dominant-strategy incentive compatible, and the designer's expected utility under the agents' truth-telling can be written as follows.
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, we have
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the constraints are satisfied with equality (otherwise we can increase the payment from the corresponding agent without decreasing the objective). Then, by a standard procedure based on integration by parts,
16 See Lavric (1993) for the proof.
Thus, the pointwise maximization of i h i (v)q i (v) implies that the solution to the right-hand side problem is q * (v) such that q *
If the second-price auction with a reserve-price function r * (·) is feasible, then this lemma would be the desired tight-bound result. However, we do not consider this feasible in this paper, because it has infinitely many messages. Nevertheless, we can find a sequence of feasible mechanisms, denoted by
, that converges to this mechanism in an appropriate sense, and hence, we treat this second-price auction as "approximately" feasible.
Specifically, define
and q
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3,
which, in particular, implies sup Γ W (Γ) = W .
Proof. Fix K ∈ N, and consider the mechanism Γ K . For each i and v i ∈ [0, 1], Therefore, given whatever admissible messages are played, agent i wins for sure in state v if
where
(1)
Because r * is continuous at almost every v −i , for each ε > 0, there exists
For revenue maximization (i.e., λ = 1), the result is qualitatively similar to Theorem 1 in Chung and Ely (2007) ("maxmin foundation" of a dominantstrategy auction), although we use different solution concepts: they consider Bayesian implementation with a universal type space (Mertens and Zamir (1985) ), while we consider admissible strategies.
18 Despite the differences, there appears to be some conceptual relationship in our arguments. Very roughly, in their Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism, for each payofftype of each agent, Chung and Ely (2007) identify a belief type whose incentive compatibility is binding. Then, they show that the optimal mechanism under these (Bayesian) incentive compatibility conditions is equivalent to that under dominant-strategy incentive compatibility. In our framework, for each payoff type of each agent, we identify an incentive condition implied by admissibility, and show that the optimal mechanism under this set of incentive conditions is equivalent to that under dominant-strategy incentive compatibility. 
Interdependent-value auction
The second application is an interdependent-value auction, where the designer's objective is revenue, i.e.,
Again, for simplicity, we assume v i = 0 and v i = 1 for each i. By Theorem 1, the upper bound for the highest expected revenue we can guarantee is
denote the minimum possible valuation that agent i with signal θ i could possess, among all θ −i . We then obtain another upper bound, W ′ , that is (weakly) even higher than W :
Intuitively, θ i p i (V (θ))dΦ represents the expected revenue in a valuerevelation mechanism (q, p) under truth-telling behavior when each i of θ i believes that his value is V i (θ i ).
Let Ψ denote the probability distribution over [0, 1] N such that, for each
. That is, Ψ is the probability measure over the minimum possible values of the agents induced by Φ. Then, we have
and therefore,
We can interpret this problem as a revenue-maximization problem in a private-value setting. As in the previous section, we introduce conditions under which the worst-case optimal mechanism is characterized. We impose the conditions on Ψ, and discuss two examples after the statement of Theorem 3 where some assumptions on Φ imply those conditions on Ψ. 
denote the virtual value of agent i given v i .
Assumption 7. (monotone virtual values) For each i and v, h
For each i, let r * i = inf{v i |h i (v i ) > 0}, or one if the set on the right-hand side is empty. By Assumption 7, such r * i uniquely exists for each i, and by Assumption 5, r * i = r * j for each i, j, and hence, we denote it by r * in the following.
We show that a second-price auction with a reserve price r * guarantees the upper-bound level of expected revenue, W ′ , which is approximated by a sequence of finite versions of second-price auctions.
second-price auction as follows:
−i , r * }, where
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 4, 5, 6, and 7, we have
Before the proof of the theorem, we provide two examples that satisfy Assumptions 4-7. In both of the examples, let 
is symmetrically and independently distributed, and also independently from c. If the signal profile c is sufficiently bad, then we assume that i can enjoy π i (c) = 0 (or any constant) by not reselling it. We further assume that C is rich enough so that, for all i and c i , there indeed exists
Then we have V i (θ i ) = d i , and therefore, Ψ satisfies Assumptions 4-6 (and Assumption 7 is also satisfied, for example, if the marginal distribution for d i has a monotone hazard rate).
Proof.
21 First, we show that
Its proof is analogous to that of Lemma 5 in the paper. For the problem of 20 More generally, if θ is independently distributed in Φ, then, for a measurable function
) is also independent. Therefore, V (θ) is also independently distributed (Assumption 6). If θ is symmetrically distributed in Φ and V i (·) = V j (·) for any i, j, then V (θ) is also symmetrically distributed (Assumption 5). 21 I thank a referee for pointing out an error in a previous version.
without loss of generality, we assume that all the constraints are satisfied with equality (otherwise we can increase the payment from the corresponding agent without decreasing the objective). Then, by a standard procedure based on integration by parts,
Thus, the pointwise maximization of i h i (v)q i (v) implies that the solution to the right-hand side problem is q
The rest of the proof is adapted from that of Theorem 2. Fix K ∈ N, and consider the mechanism Γ K . For each i and
Suppose that each agent i with type θ i reports a message in {κ i (θ i ), . . . , κ i (θ i )}. Then, the minimum possible revenue given such behaviors is at least p(θ) in state θ, where
Let θ be such that, for some i,
* , and thus, we have either (i) m i > m
In Case (i), q K i (m) = 1 and
and in Case (ii),
Therefore, in either of the cases, we have
This implies that Γ K guarantees
Thus, for each ε > 0, there exists K(ε) such that, for any K > K(ε),
Although the result is qualitatively similar to the first application to private-value auctions, it has a quite different interpretation, because a secondprice auction is generally neither dominant-strategy nor ex post incentive compatible with interdependent values. In fact, the result suggests that the new class of incentive conditions identified in this paper, namely incentive compatibility for value revelation, plays a key role in understanding the highest performance guarantee in interdependent-value settings.
Private-value bilateral trade
The third application is surplus maximization in private-value bilateral trade (Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) , Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) ). Specifically, let I = {1, 2}, where i = 1 is a seller and i = 2 is a buyer. For each i,
Let (q, p) ∈ [0, 1] × R represent the trade allocation, where q is the probability that the seller provides the good to the buyer, and p is the payment from the buyer to the seller. The seller's utility given (q, p) ∈ X is p − c 1 q, where c 1 ∈ [0, 1] is the seller's opportunity cost, and the buyer's utility given (q, p) is v 2 q − p.
Note that this notation is consistent with that introduced in Section 2. Specifically, in the model introduced in Section 2, let v 1 ∈ [−1, 0], v 2 ∈ [0, 1], and X = {(q i , p i ) i∈I |q 1 = q 2 ∈ [0, 1], p 2 = −p 1 ∈ R} be the set of feasible allocations. Then, the seller's utility is v 1 q 1 − p 1 = p 2 − (−v 1 )q 2 and the buyer's utility is v 2 q 2 − p 2 . By identifying −v 1 as c 1 and (q 2 , p 2 ) as (q, p), we obtain the bilateral-trade model in this subsection.
The designer's objective is surplus, i.e.,
By Theorem 1, the upper bound for the highest expected surplus we can guarantee is
and hence, by rewriting a revelation mechanism with respect to (c 1 , v 2 ) instead of (v 1 , v 2 ), we have
In contrast to the auction environments, a feasible allocation has to satisfy the budget-balance condition, and hence, it is not obvious whether or not the solution to the upper-bound problem satisfies all the constraints with equality.
In the following, we introduce a sufficient condition for the environment under which the solution to the upper-bound problem is dominant-strategy incentive compatible.
Assumption 8. (monotone weighted surplus) Φ is absolutely continuous (with respect to a Lebesgue measure on R 2 ) with a continuous density φ.
is strictly decreasing in c 1 and strictly increasing in v 2 .
µ(c 1 , v 2 ) quantifies the impact on expected surplus of making the agents trade, or in other words, it is the trade surplus in state (c 1 , v 2 ) weighted by the density of the state, φ(c 1 , v 2 ). The monotonicity of the weighted surplus µ in Assumption 8 means that more-efficient types (i.e., lower c 1 and higher v 2 ) have higher impacts on expected surplus.
For example, the condition is satisfied if (i) more efficient types are more likely, i.e., the density φ(c 1 , v 2 ) is nonincreasing in c 1 and nondecreasing in v 2 , or if (ii) φ is differentiable and the rate of change in φ is sufficiently small so that, for any (c 1 , v 2 ),
22
A posted-price mechanism with price r ∈ [0, 1] is a revelation mechanism (q, p) such that (q(c 1 , v 2 ), p(c 1 , v 2 )) = (1, r) if v 2 > r > c 1 , and (q(c 1 , v 2 ), p(c 1 , v 2 )) = (0, 0) otherwise. It is dominant-strategy incentive compatible, 23 and it guarantees the following expected surplus,
22 We measure the fractional change in the seller's type with respect to the highest-cost type, so we have 1 − c 1 instead of c 1 in the denominator. The condition is satisfied for a class of common distributions under appropriate truncation and restrictions on parameter values. 23 More rigorously, truth-telling is the unique admissible choice for every type of each agent i except for the threshold type (i.e., the type with cost or value equal to r), which occurs with probability zero under Assumption 8.
Observe that, under Assumption 8, this is strictly concave in r. Thus, the optimal posted price, r * , uniquely exists, and is characterized by the first-order condition:
Theorem 4. Under Assumption 8, we have
The theorem states that the upper-bound expected surplus can be guaranteed by the posted-price mechanism with r * . Note that the posted-price mechanism with r * itself can be considered to be feasible. 25 Therefore, we obtain the tightness of W . Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) show that essentially any dominant-strategy mechanism in this bilateral-trade setting is a (possibly randomized) postedprice mechanism. Our result says that, even if nondominant-strategy mechanisms are allowed, the designer would optimally choose a (deterministic) posted-price mechanism if he aims to guarantee the highest possible expected surplus.
To provide an intuition for how Assumption 8 plays a role for Theorem 4, we ask if the posted-price mechanism with price r * can be improved by modifying the mechanism. Suppose some improvement was possible, for example, in some states where c 1 < v 2 < r * (a similar argument holds for the other case where improvement was possible in states where v 2 > c 1 > r * ).
The trading price is necessarily less than r * , which makes the buyer with v 2 ∈ (r * , r * + ε) prefer this new outcome to trading with price r * for some ε > 0. This implies that, in the worst-case scenario, welfare loss must occur in some states where v 2 ∈ (r * , r * + ε) and c 1 < r * . However, under the 24 I thank Gabriel Carroll for pointing out an error in a previous version. 25 For example, consider a mechanism Γ * = M * , (q * , p * ) with (i) M * i = {0, 1} for each i, and (ii) (q * (m), p * (m)) = (1, r * ) if m = (1, 1), and q * (m) = p * (m) = 0 otherwise. This is feasible, and equivalent to the posted-price mechanism with r * .
monotone weighted surplus in Assumption 8, this welfare loss is greater than the welfare gain. This assumption basically states that allowing more trade in states where the buyer's value is higher has a greater impact on the expected surplus than allowing more trade in states where the buyer's value is lower.
Proof. For each v 2 ∈ (r * , 1), define r(v 2 ) so that
Because µ is strictly decreasing in c 1 , strictly increasing in v 2 , and continuous, r(v 2 ) uniquely exists for each v 2 ∈ (r * , 1). As a function of v 2 , r is strictly decreasing and differentiable, where
Moreover, r(v 2 ) → r * as v 2 ↓ r * , and r(v 2 ) → 0 as v 2 ↑ 1.
We decompose the upper-bound problem into infinitely many subproblems. Specifically, for each v 2 ∈ (r * , 1), the subproblem v 2 is given by
∀v 2 ∈ (r * , 1). 
For each v 2 ∈ (r * , 1), q o satisfies all the constraints of the subproblem v 2 ,
where the inequality is because q o satisfies all the constraints in the problem of W . Therefore,
where the equality is obtained by substituting v 1 with r(v 2 ). Because ε > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain the desired inequality.
Lemma 7. For each v 2 ∈ (r * , 1), we have
Proof. In the subproblem v 2 , because both the objective and constraints are linear in q(·), in the solution, there exists a threshold value µ * ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies the following. For eachṽ 2 ∈ (0, v 2 ), we have q(r(v 2 ),ṽ 2 ) = 1 if 1 , τ * 2 ) that satisfies these conditions is such that
These lemmas imply
However, the right-hand side coincides with the worst-case expected surplus guaranteed by the posted-price mechanism with price r * .
Concluding remarks
This paper studies the mechanism design problem of guaranteeing desirable performances whenever the agents are rational in the sense of not playing weakly dominated strategies. In Section 3, we provide an upper bound for the best performance guarantee among all feasible mechanisms. This upper bound is given by the supremum of the truth-telling outcome in a mechanism where each agent reports his own "valuation". Then, in Section 4, we apply this upper bound to private-value and interdependent-value auctions and private-value bilateral trade. Under certain conditions on the designer's prior over the agents' payoff types, we show that the upper bound is tight, and obtain the worst-case optimal mechanisms (with a limiting argument when the exact optimal mechanism is infeasible). In private-value environments, the optimal mechanisms satisfy dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, the classical notion of "robust" mechanisms. More specifically, in an auction setting, the optimal mechanism for a weighted average of expected revenue and surplus is a second-price auction (with a reserve-price function) under the monotone virtual-value condition. In a bilateral-trade setting, the optimal mechanism for expected surplus is a posted-price mechanism under the monotone weighted-surplus condition. In an interdependent-value auction, we find that the optimal mechanism is a second-price auction, which is neither dominant-strategy nor ex post incentive compatible, but satisfies the novel incentive compatibility introduced in the paper, which we refer to as incentive compatibility for value revelation.
While we identify several environments where the upper bound is tight, we believe that it would also be useful to provide instances where the bound is not tight. For example, in the bilateral-trade application in Section 4.3, imagine that the designer's prior Φ is discrete and Φ(c 1 , v 2 ) = , because, under the first-best trade rule q(0, , 1) = 1 (and q(c 1 , v 2 ) = 0 otherwise), the integral envelope conditions reduce to ex post individualrationality conditions. However, no feasible mechanism can guarantee the first-best trade surplus.
27
Intuitively, the integral envelope condition in Theorem 1 corresponds to local and downward incentive compatibility, and therefore, a solution to the upper-bound problem may not satisfy other constraints such as global incentive constraints, especially when the solution to 26 Although Φ is not absolutely continuous in this example, the argument does not essentially change as long as an (absolutely continuous) Φ is close (in an appropriate sense) to the one discussed here.
27 Suppose contrarily that a feasible mechanism M, g could guarantee the first-best the upper-bound problem is not monotonic, as in this counterexample.
There are several possible directions for future research. First, even though we focus on linear environments, some concepts and techniques developed in this paper may be useful in more general mechanism design or implementation problems. For example, for some assignment problems with divisible goods, it may be more natural to allow for the agents' utilities being nonlinear in q. The working paper version of this analysis, Yamashita (2013a) , establishes a similar upper bound as in Theorem 1 (or Corollary 1) in such a nonlinear environment but with private values. As another example, for some mechanism design problems without monetary transfers, dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (or strategy-proof) mechanisms are examined in the literature in private-value environments.
28 The counterpart of incentive compatibility for value revelation (or more generally "preference revelation") may naturally be defined in those problems but with interdependence. It may be interesting to see whether mechanisms that satisfy such incentive conditions perform well. One of the challenges would be to extend our upper-bound result to more general environments, which is left for future research. Second, although only finite mechanisms are feasible in this paper, it would be desirable to extend Theorem 1 to some class of environments with infinite mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms with infinitely many messages). Jackson (1992) shows that essentially any social choice correspondence is implementable if we allow for arbitrary infinite mechanisms, based on the "integergame" or "tail-chasing" arguments. Thus, he offers a class of mechanism called bounded mechanisms, which includes all the finite mechanisms but also infinite mechanisms without "integer-game" or "tail-chasing" structures. Therefore, an appropriate question would be whether Theorem 1 extends to the environments with (infinite but) bounded mechanisms.
28 See, for example, Moulin (1980) for single-peaked voting problems, and Gale and Shapley (1962) , Dubins and Freedman (1981) , and Roth (1982) for matching problems.
